” The Navy is planning to use the DPA to ensure that it has a reliable, cost-competitive supply of military fuels. DPA-invested production capacity will be, by contract, providing fuels at a cost-competitive price and with a dedicated supply to the military. The US Navy, like everyone else, is determined not to repeat the mistake of recent years and buying renewable fuels in the open market.

In this way, it is returning to the same strategy it used in the conversion from coal to petroleum back in the early 1900s.

The oil industry in Wyoming really got underway with the Teapot Dome complex, which was a Navy fuel production depot. Ultimately that complex was released to the public (initiating an energy brouhaha – the Teapot Dome scandal – that makes the upheaval over Solyndra look like chicken feed, and was described as the most serious public scandal prior to Watergate). President Harding’s Interior Secretary, Albert Fall, in fact went to jail as a result of the scandal, the first US cabinet official ever to do so.

The British Navy did much the same when converting from coal to oil. Concerned over supplies and costs, First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill pushed through a plan to found the Anglo-Persian Oil Company to guarantee affordable, reliable sources of the new fuel. Today, that company is still around – it’s BP.”

Tags: navy WWII

"Scheduled to run for three days, energyMMOWGLI will immerse players in a future energy scenario from the year 2022 (view scenario at http://portal.mmowgli.nps.edu), and will ask them to generate ideas about how to reduce energy consumption, improve energy efficiency, and diversify its energy supply for the sake of future strategic readiness."

— Funny that, looks like the Navy is using games as a way to model the future.

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The decision to beef up India’s naval muscle at Lakshadweep has its roots in security concerns in the wake of the terrorist attacks in Mumbai in 2008 and the rising threat of pirate attacks in the Arabian Sea in recent years. Lakshadweep’s strategic significance stems not only from its proximity to the Indian mainland but also, Nine Degree Channel - a 200-kilometer wide stretch of water through which much of the shipping between West Asia and South East Asia transits runs to the north of Minicoy, the southern-most of the islands.

The magnitude of India’s concern over the safety of sea lanes can be gauged from the fact that over 97% percent of India’s trade by volume and 75% by value is sea borne. The key role that the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean play in meeting its India’s energy requirements is evident from the fact that 67% of this comes from the Persian Gulf and 17% from Africa.

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— An interesting look at recent moves by the Indian Navy.

Tags: india navy

"In other words, in order to defeat a well-planned, well-executed, defensive operation on key terrain utilizing every weapon at the enemy’s disposal, we’re going to utilize a well-planned, well-executed, offensive operation on key terrain utilizing every weapon at our disposal."

— Brett Friedman dissects Pentagonese to show that AirSeaBattle as a doctrine is essentially “we will fight the enemy defenses with our own countermeasures,” which is  the fundamental truth of every strategy ever. The danger in AirSeaBattle being a doctrine is that it will lead to acquisitions and a force designed for…nothing particularly unique, really. Which means an open market for those pitching AirSeaBattle-capable weaponry, and not the clearest outcome for the American armed forces who will have to rely on both those weapons and the doctrine they were designed for. Not that weapons shouldn’t serve strategy, but strategy needs to be way more complex than “fight them with our weapons” for there to be a meaningful synthesis.

"His analysis would make more sense if there were Filipino marines on one of those reefs. They either move or they get shot at. There’s a pressure point in which military force can be allowed to work either through force or intimidation. But I don’t see any such fixed pressure point in those three issues. There’s nothing here that an armada can permanently change even if it went in with guns blazing. The Chinese armada will arrive and float around and… float around. The solo blue water Filipino ship will wisely keep a distance. The Gregorio del Pilar is not going to charge into a 21st century fleet with 19th century weapons in its first year of commission."

— Over at The Comparativist, there’s a post on the tensions between China and the Philippines over the South China Sea. It’s an interesting war of words, especially because the Philippines lack the naval capacity to even pretend to contest the disputed waters.

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The boat - painted in Navy gray and with a striking resemblance to a PT boat - is 39 feet long and can reach a top speed of 28 knots. Using a modified version of the unmanned Shadow surveillance aircraft technology that logged 700,000 hours of duty in the Middle East, the boat can be controlled remotely from 10 to 12 miles away from a command station on land, at sea or in the air, Haslett said.

Farther out, it can be switched to a satellite control system, which Textron said could expand its range to 1,200 miles. The boat could be launched from virtually any large Navy vessel.

It’s not the first unmanned boat. But Haslett said others generally have been boats simply refitted with remote control equipment. The CUSV was designed from the first step not to have a crew.

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Drones in the sea = super-futuristic. Drones powered by diesel: significantly less so.

(Source: m.phys.org)

Future green navies, take note: a solar powered ship has already circumnavigated the globe.